More on preference and freedom

The paper seeks to formalize the notion of effective freedom or freedom to realize meaningful choices. The definition of meaningful choice used in this paper is based on the preference orderings of a reasonable person in a society. 1 argue that only the alternatives that can be selected by a reasonable person from the set of all possible alternatives provide a meaningful choice. 1 discuss this approach and provide an axiomatization of the cardinal rule and two lexicographic versions of this rule in this context

Games of capacities : a (close) look to Nash Equilibria

The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes

Stability in one-sided matching markets

The stable roommates problem may be unsolvable for sorne instances, therefore we study a relaxation, when it is allowed to form groups of any size (the stable partition problem). Two extensions of preferences over individuals to preferences over sets are suggested. For the first one, derived from the most prefered member of a set, it is shown that a stable partition always existis if the original preferences are strict and a simple algorithm for its computation is derived. This algorithm turns out to be strategy proof. The second extension, based on the least prefered member of a set, produces solutions very similar to those for the stable roornmates problem

Understanding preference formation in a matching market

We analyze the role of formal and informal information gathering in students' preference formation. We analyzed this role in the college admission process using Spanish individual data. We introduce students' risk aversion and information costs on the standard college admission problem. Then, we model the students' list formation as a two-stage procedure. In first stage, students must decide whether they gather information or not about a college. In the second stage, they give their preferred list to the matching office. The observed changes in preferences suggest that information gathering is important in the last two months of the process and that students with less ex-ante information are more affected by these changes

Games of capacities : a (close) look to Nash Equilibria

The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes.

Re-Reforming the Bostonian System: A Novel Approach to the Schooling Problem

This paper proposes the notion of E-stability to conciliate Pareto efficiency and fairness. We propose the use of a centralized procedure, the Exchanging Places Mechanism. It endows students a position according with the Gale and Shapley students optimal stable matching as tentative allocation and allows the student to trade their positions. We show that the final allocation is E-stable, i.e. efficient, fair and immune to any justifiable objection that students can formulate.School allocation problem, Pareto efficient matching

- SEQUENTIAL DECISIONS IN THE COLLEGE ADMISSIONS PROBLEM

This paper studies the sequential mechanisms which mimic matching procedures formany-to-one-real-life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing thestudent´ optimal allocation in subgame perfect equibrium.Matching, Implementation, Mechanism Design

On Preference, Freedom and Diversity

We study the problem of ranking sets of options in terms of freedom of choice. We propose a framework in which both the diversity of the options and the preferences of the agent over the options do play a role. We formulate some axioms that reflect these two aspects of freedom and we study their logical implications. Two diifferent criteria for ranking sets are characterized, which generalize some of the rankings proposed so far in the literatureRanking Sets; Freedom of Choice; Diversity relations

Games of Capacities: A (Close) Look to Nash Equilibria

The paper studies two games of capacity manipulation in hospital-intern markets. The focus is on the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes. We provide minimal necessary and sufficient conditions guaranteeing the existence of pure strategy Nash Equilibria and the stability of outcomes.Stable Matchings, Capacity, Nash Equilibrium, Cycles.

Sequential decisions in the college admissions problem.

This paper studies sequential mechanisms which mimic a matching procedures for many-to-one real life matching markets. We provide a family of mechanisms implementing the students' optimal allocation in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium.Matching markets; College admission problems; Mechanism design;